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NOTES
INTERNATIONAL LAW-EXTRATERRITORIALITYANTITRUST LAW-Development of the Defense
of Sovereign Compulsion
Recent decades have witnessed a remarkable and continuing
expansion of American business abroad. This expansion has generally been viewed as desirable and in accord with American national
interests and economic policies. However, such expansion has had the
drawback of exposing American businesses to the demands of the
various economic laws, policies, and customs of the countries into
which they have moved. American courts have consistently held that
an American business operating abroad is subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States antitrust laws when the activities of the business
substantially affect interstate or foreign commerce.1 This extraterritorial application of the federal antitrust laws has confronted businessmen doing business abroad with conflicts between American law
and the law of the foreign country in which they are operating.
One of the most troublesome of these conflicts arises when an
American business abroad is subjected to an order of a foreign government and the carrying out of that order requires that business to
violate the antitrust laws of the United States. The recent case of
Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco Maracaibo, Incorporated2 confronted an American court with this precise issue
for the first time. 3 The United States District Court for the District
of Delaware responded by saying that the defendants had been compelled to act as they did by the orders of a foreign sovereign government,4 and it held that such "sovereign compulsion," when proved,
I. The Supreme Court, in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962), citing prior decisions going back to United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (19ll), held that the antitrust jurisdiction of the United
States federal courts extended to a conspiracy to restrain the foreign or domestic
commerce of the United States even though the conduct complained of occurred in a
foreign country. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444
(2d Cir. 1945), in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that even a
foreign company acting in a foreign country was subject to United States antitrust
laws if its activities substantially affected American commerce and if such effects were
intended by that foreign company.
2. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del, 1970).
3. There was no jurisdiction question in the Interamerican case. All parties were
American corporations, and, while the activity complained of by the plaintiff took
place partly in Venezuela, the agreement and subsequent conduct of the defendants
affected American foreign commerce. As a result, the question of jurisdiction fell
squarely within the language of the Supreme Court in Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962), discussed in note I supra.
This Note will assume that jurisdiction is present whenever the applicability of the
defense of sovereign compulsion is under discussion.
4. 307 F. Supp. at 1296.
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constitutes a complete defense to an antitrust action. 5 It is the purpose of this Note to explore this newly promulgated doctrine of
sovereign compulsion in order to determine the basis on which it is
founded and the practical difficulties and consequences that may result from its application.
l.

THE INTERAMERICAN DECISION

A.

Background

The plaintiffs in Interamerican brought an action under the
Sherman6 and Clayton7 Acts, alleging that the defendants had engaged in a "concerted boycott designed to deny Interamerican
Venezuelan crude oil required for its operations."8 Interamerican
was an American corporation engaged in the business of processing
Venezuelan crude oil at its bonded refinery in Bayonne, New
Jersey. 9 The principal stockholders of Interamerican were Venezuelan nationals, two of whom were personae non gratae to the present
Venezuelan Government.
Defendants Texaco Maracaibo, Incorporated (Supven) 10 and
Monsanto Venezuela, Incorporated (Monven)11 held concessions
from the Venezuelan Government for the production of crude oil.
In the course of their operations, they supplied crude oil to defendant Amoco Trading Company, an American company that was not
actually operating within Venezuela.12 Interamerican contracted to
obtain its crude oil through Amoco and thereafter received three
shipments.13
5. 307 F. Supp. at 1296.
6. Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). Section 1 of the Sherman
Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or othenvise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal •••" (emphasis added).
7. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in
part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained ••••"
8. !107 F. Supp. at 1292.
9. Interamerican planned to place its refined oil on the market at a low price by
processing it in a bonded refinery and then exporting it or selling it as ship's bunker
-fuel oil that the ship uses itself-in New York harbor, thereby avoiding United States
import quota and tariff restrictions. 307 F. Supp. at 1292.
10. Texaco Maracaibo was formerly the Superior Oil Company of Venezuela
(Supven).
11. Monsanto Venezuela, Inc. (Monven) was a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Monsanto Company.
12. As a trading company, Amoco was the middle man between refineries and
producers of crude oil in Venezuela and other countries. In the instant case, Amoco
loaded the crude oil produced by Supven and Monven into its tankers at Venezuelan
ports and then shipped it to Interamerican.
13. The first shipment originated with Monven, the last two with Supven.
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Foreign oil concerns doing business in Venezuela hold their concessions subject to regulation by the government's Ministry Gf Mines
and Hydrocarbons. This ministry supervises and reviews the sales
policies of concessionaries and promulgates rules governing the sale
of oil produced in Venezuela. 14 Among the sanctions imposed for
violating these rules is the suspension of the right to ship oil out of
Venezuela.lli Pursuant to this authority, after the first shipments to
Interamerican, Supven and Monven were called before the Ministry
and were instructed that no more Venezuelan oil was to reach Interamerican. The reasons behind these instructions were mixed. They
apparently stemmed partly from the personal animosity that certain
high Venezuelan Government officials felt toward the chief shareholders of Interamerican16 and partly from an attempt by the
ministry to effectuate certain Venezuelan economic policy objectives.17
After receipt of these instructions, Amoco informed Interamerican that it could no longer supply it with Venezuelan crude oil, since
the Venezuelan Government had forbidden either direct or indirect
sales to Interamerican. In fact, all of the defendants refused to sell
Venezuelan crude to Interamerican unless the Venezuelan Government would lift the ban. As a result of these refusals to deal, Interamerican brought a treble-damage action under section 4 of the
Clayton antitrust law18 claiming that defendants were engaging in
an unlawful concerted refusal to deal.19
B.

Prior Cases

The defendants did not deny the charge that they had concertedly
refused to deal with Interamerican. Rather, they argued that foreign
governmental compulsion is a complete defense to an antitrust action
based on such a charge.2° Chief Judge Caleb Wright of the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware agreed. Finding
that the defendants had been compelled to engage in a concerted
refusal to deal by the Venezuelan Government, he held that "a
14. 307 F. Supp. at 1294.
15. 307 F. Supp. at 1294.
16. 307 F. Supp. at 1295-96. See text following note 9 supra.
17. The two principal economic policy objectives of the Venezuelan Government
appeared to be a desire to keep Venezuelan crude oil from going to "unnatural" markets
such as Canada and Europe, and a fear of allowing crude oil to go to a bonded
refinery, such as Interamerican's, because of the low price at which such oil could be
sold on the international market. 307 F. Supp. at 1294-95.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). See note 7 supra.
19. A concerted refusal to deal occurs when a group of traders agree to boycottnot deal with-another trader. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207! 212 (1959).
20. Joint Brief for Defendants at 50-52, Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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showing of bona fide compulsion by a foreign government immunizes an otherwise illegal boycott."21
As Chief Judge Wright acknowledged, Interamerican presented a
case of first impression. There is no statutory authority providing
for the defense of sovereign compulsion, and there are no prior reported American cases specifically holding that the defense is an
appropriate one. The court did, however, find relevant dicta in the
cases of Continental Ore Company v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation22 and United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Incorporated (Swiss Watch). 23
The Continental Ore case involved a charge that Union Carbide
had conspired with one of its subsidiaries, Electro Metallurgical
Company of Canada, Ltd. (Electro Met), to monopolize vanadium
production and sales in Canada.24 Electro Met had been appointed
by the Canadian Government to be its exclusive purchasing agent of
vanadium. The United States Supreme Court, per Justice White,
held that Electro Met was not excused from refusing to deal with
Continental Ore, an American corporation that sold vanadium,
simply because it was "acting in a manner permitted by Canadian
law."25 The Court, however, seemed to qualify its holding by observing that there was "no indication that the Controller or any other
[Canadian] official ... directed that purchases from Continental be
stopped." 26 Commentators have read this statement as implying that
if the Canadian Government actually had made such a direction, the
Court would have reached a different result. 27
In the Swiss Watch case, Swiss and American makers and sellers
of watches and watch parts were charged with a conspiracy to restrain
United States commerce in watches. 28 The heart of the conspiracy
was the Collective Convention, a private agreement among associations of Swiss manufacturers and some individual American manufacturers. One of the designs of the Convention was to regulate the flow
of Swiss watch parts to American watchmakers with the intended
purpose of suppressing the American watch industry. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that this in21. 307 F. Supp. at 1297 n.14.
22. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See note I supra.
23. 1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
24. Vanadium is a rare metal used in producing vanadium steel-a tough and
durable steel.
25. 370 U.S. at 706-07.
26. 370 U.S. at 706.
27. See, e.g., Barnard, Extra-Territoriality and Anti-Trust Law in the United
States, 6 SUPP. INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 95, 104 (1963); Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and
Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REv. 925, 934 (1962); Graziano, Foreign Governmental
Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INTL. L. 100, 136-37
(1967).
28. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,416.
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tended purpose was in fact effectuated by the curtailment of watch
parts exported from Switzerland to the United States. 29 The court
recognized that the Swiss watch industry was heavily regulated by the
Swiss Government and that the Collective Convention was encouraged by that government. However, the court emphasized that
participation in the Collective Convention was not required by
Swiss law.30 As a result, the defendants were held liable for participating in the privately agreed-upon restrictive practices, even though
such practices were permitted under Swiss law.31 Significantly, the
opinion by Judge Cashin distinguished this case from the situation
where a foreign government compels businesses to engage in
activities that violate American antitrust laws: "If, of course, the
defendant's activities had been required by Swiss law, this court
could indeed do nothing. " 32
C.

Justification for the Sovereign Compulsion Defense

In the Interamerican case, Chief Judge Wright declined to base
his holding that a sovereign compulsion defense was appropriately
raised solely on the precedential authority of the dicta in these two
earlier cases. He also emphasized that two basic policy concerns
dictated recognizing this defense: fairness to the coerced businessman
and intergovernmental comity.
When an American business abroad is ordered by the foreign
country in which it is operating to do an act that violates American
antitrust laws, that business is confronted with a harsh dilemma. If
it does not comply, it may well be forced to end its operations in the
foreign country and thereby sustain great financial loss. On the other
hand, if it does comply, it could be faced with a crippling trebledamage action in an American federal court. The district court in
Interamerican recognized the need for resolving such a dilemma.
A desire to resolve the conflict appeared to be the motivating force
behind the court's decision to adopt the concept of sovereign compulsion.33
29. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,424.
30. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,426. Although adherence to the Convention was not required by the Swiss Government, that government played a very substantial role in
the conduct of the Swiss watch industry. The great interest taken by the Swiss Government in the industry and in this suit exemplifies the importance of conflicts that can
arise between the United States antitrust system and foreign systems of governmentsupported or government-compelled private regulation. For a thorough discussion of
the Swiss Watch case, see 4 BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS:
CollrMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST ch. 6
Rahl ed. 1970) [hereinafter J. Rahl].
31. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,456.
32. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,456.
33. Chief Judge Wright, in his opinion, enunciated his concern in these terms:
Commerce may exist at the will of the government, and to impose liability for
obedience to that will would eliminate for many companies the ability to transact

a.
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As has been noted, this court was not the first to indicate concern
for the plight of American businesses abroad that find themselves
caught in conflicts between American antitrust law and the laws of
foreign states. The Supreme Court in Continental Ore, as well as
the district court in Swiss Watch, indicated in dicta that governmental compulsion should immunize the business involved from
antitrust liability.34 Similarly, American courts, in fashioning consent decrees and other forms of equitable relief, have in a number
of instances exhibited considerable caution in requiring extraterritorial compliance. In some cases, the courts have provided that the
coerced party may be excused from compliance with decrees when
such compliance would require contravention of a foreign country's
law within that country's territory. 35 Furthermore, in the procedural
area of discovery, the Supreme Court has excused nonproduction of
documents by a party to a suit when such documents are located in a
foreign country and their production is barred by the laws of that
country.36 Thus, the Interamerican court's policy objective of fairly
business in foreign lands. ·were compulsion not a defense, American firms abroad
faced with a government order would have to choose one country or the other
in which to do business. The Sherman Act does not go so far.
307 F, Supp. at 1298.
34. See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
35. See, e.g., United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
74,203, 74:2,07 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (exception for "any act in a foreign nation in violation
of any law • • • of said foreign nation''); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958
Trade Cas. 73,790, 73,801 (E.D. La. 1958) (exception "if such action is required by
the Government of the country in which the act takes place''); United States v. American Smelting &: Ref. Co,, 1957 Trade Cas. 73,798, 73,402 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (exception for
"any act in a foreign country • . • required of defendant • . . by the government
thereof''); United States v. General Elec. Co., ll5 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D.N.J. 1953)
(exception "for doing anything outside of the United States which is required • . .
under the laws of the government .•. in which Philips . • . may be incorporated,
chartered or organized or . . . doing business''); United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd., Civil No. 24-13 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1952) (Final Judgment), cited in Fugate,
supra note 27, at 934 n.44, court's opinion at 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (exception
to the injunction against the British defendant for acts "in compliance with any law
of ••• any government or instrumentality thereof, to which ICI is at the time being
subject, and concerning matters over which, under the laws of the United States, such
foreign government has jurisdiction'').
It should be noted that such deference by the courts has undergone a change in
rationale. In the early cases, the courts felt that American law dictated that one nation
could not order conduct to be carried on in another nation unless that conduct was
legal in the other nation. See United States v. General Elec. Co., ll5 F. Supp. 835
(D.N.J. 1953); R.EsrATEMENT OF CONFLicr OF LAws § 94 (1934). Recently, however,
American authorities have adopted the view that American courts have the power to
order conduct abroad even if it is illegal in the foreign country. See, e.g., R.EsrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 39 (1965). Although the courts have recognized
such power, they have refrained from employing it, in an attempt to avoid placing parties in positions in which they must violate foreign laws. See Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See generally J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 118-20.
36. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In this case, the Supreme
Court held: "It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a
weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws
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treating businessmen caught between conflicting laws of. different
sovereigns reflects a policy that has long been articulated and implemented by the federal courts.
In addition to this sound policy objective, the court in Interamerican rested its decision on an ambiguously expressed desire to
foster and maintain international comity. The opinion contains an
undertone of concern that a judgment against the defendants could
be construed as a judgment against the foreign sovereign. The court
clearly wanted to avoid the potentially troublesome ramifications of
such an interpretation. Accordingly, the court simply considered the
acts of the defendants to be the acts of the foreign sovereign itself:
It requires no precedent, however, to acknowledge that sovereignty includes the right to regulate commerce within the nation.
When a nation compels a trade practice, firms then have no choice
but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign.37

Although Chief Judge Wright neglected, perhaps intentionally, to
set forth the theoretical or doctrinal basis for this concept,38 the
preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign." 357 U.S. at 211. The Court
went on to hold that the petitioner was excused from compliance with the pretrial
production order because the laws of Switzerland preventing disclosure made such
compliance impossible.
37. 307 F. Supp. at 1298. Many legal writers have accepted this concept of considering the acts of the companies involved as having effectively become those of the
fon:ign government and have expressed the opinion that acts ordered by a foreign
government should be exempt from enforcement of American antitrust laws. See
ArroRNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. To STUDY nm ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 83 (1955)
[hereinafter ATIORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 92-93 (1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAws 148 (1958); H. KRONSTEIN, J. MILLER & I. SCHWARTZ, MODERN AMERICAN ANTITRUST
LAW 267 (1958); J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 238; Timberg, United States and Foreign
Antitrust Laws Governing International Business Transactions, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 619, 624 (Surrey & Shaw ed. 1963); Barnard,
supra note 27, at 103; Celler, A Congressman's View of Foreign Commerce Aspects of
the Sherman Act, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 3 (1965); Graziano, supra note 27, at 116.
38. To support the proposition that the acts of the defendants effectively become
the acts of the foreign sovereign, some legal ·writers have cited the famous case of
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See W. FUGATE, supra
note 37, at 148; J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 238. However, reliance upon American
Banana to support a sovereign compulsion defense seems very questionable.
The American Banana case involved the occupation of plaintiff's property in
Panama by actual agents of the Costa Rican Government. The plaintiff had brought
suit alleging defendant's liability for having instigated the occupation. Under these
circumstances, and under a territorially based jurisdiction concept, the Supreme
Court held that the defendant could not be held liable for acts actually carried out by
a foreign government. 213 U.S. at 357-58.
The jurisdiction concept of territoriality used by the Court in American Banana,
which provides that acts done in a foreign country must be judged by the law of that
foreign country, 213 U.S. at 356, although never expressly overruled, has been consis•
tently overlooked by the Court in later decisions involving the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
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equation of the corporations and the foreign government did provide
one springboard for his decision to immunize the defendants' activities. He reasoned that the compelled acts of the defendants
are to be treated the same as if they had been acts of the foreign
sovereign and that either (I) acts of foreign sovereigns are not
within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act or (2) even if American
courts do have jurisdiction, they cannot inquire into the validity or
legality of the acts of the foreign sovereign.39 In order to support
its proposition that the Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction
over the acts of a foreign sovereign, the district court sought to
analogize the sovereign compulsion question with the doctrine of
Parker v. Brown.40
The Parker case involved a program authorized by the California
Agricultural Prorate Act,41 an act that provided for the adoption of
joint marketing plans regulating the sale of raisins. Private producers of raisins devised these plans, and the practical control actually
exercised by the state was limited to a veto power occasionally
utilized by the state Director of Agriculture. The Supreme
Court agreed that the scheme resulted in restricted competition in
the marketing of raisins.42 It was quite clear that had the producers
agreed upon the scheme privately and had no state action been involved, the marketing plans would have constituted a combination
in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. However, the
Supreme Court held that anticompetitive actions by private producers that resulted from compliance with a state regulatory program were not the subject of antitrust liability.43 The Court stated
that "the Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (19ll).
Moreover, the American Banana opinion contains no language that would control
the sovereign compulsion problem. The Court limited its decision to ruling upon acts
actually carried out by the foreign sovereign and did not encompass the separable
problem of acts compelled by the sovereign but carried out by private business. As a
result, it would seem that the only continuing validity of American Banana is its
availability to the Court as a building block should the Court decide to hold that
American courts do not have jurisdiction over sovereign compulsion disputes. In so
holding, however, the Court would need to revert to the territorial approach of juris•
diction and somehow distinguish the sovereign compulsion situation from all other
antitrust settings involved in cases decided since American Tobacco, which ignored the
American Banana holding, that reject such an approach. Such a course by the Court
seems at best unlikely.
39. 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99.
40. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). This case was noted by Chief Judge Wright at 307 F. Supp.
at 1298 n.18.
41. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933] Statutes of California, as amended CAL, Acruc.
CoDE § 59501 (West 1968).
42. 317 U.S. at 352.
43. 317 U.S. at 352.
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action directed by a state. " 44 The Court thought that in the absence
of such mention congressional intent to interfere with the "sovereignty" of the state was not "lightly to be attributed." 45
Such a policy of solicitude for governmental sovereignty might
be applied in the Interamerican context. But, although both Interamerican and Parker v. Brown obviously involved the influence and
effects of governmental action, the analogy between the two cases is
othenvise forced. Parker v. Brown stands for the limited proposition that a state government, which is a constituent part of the
American federal scheme, enjoys immunity from the federal antitrust laws and that it may extend this immunity to companies
operating under its established program.46 It is not at all the same to
say that a foreign government, which is not subordinate to the Constitution of the United States and which may harbor values alien to
traditionally accepted American values, can similarly order the laws
of the United States to be violated with impunity.47 As a result,
although Parker v. Brown has certain factual similarities to Interamerican, it is by no means sufficient authority in itself for the
broad construction of the scope of the defense of sovereign compulsion announced by the district court in Interamerican.
Foreseeing the possible inapplicability of the Parker v. Brown
doctrine, the court in Interamerican also asserted that even if it had
jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign's acts, the act-of-state doctrine
prevented it from inquiring into the legality of those acts.48 Although an act-of-state situation does present striking similarities to
a sovereign compulsion setting, it is questionable whether the act-ofstate doctrine provides controlling authority for the latter situation.
The act-of-state doctrine can be traced to the case of Underhill v.
44. 317 U.S. at 351.
45. 317 U.S. at 351.
46. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
47. An analogous situation is present in the area of vertical resale price maintenance agreements. Such agreements are generally illegal per se under American
antitrust laws. United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); AnoRNEY
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 150. However, the McGuire Amendment of 1952,
Act of July 14, 1952, ch, 745, § 2, 66 Stat. 631, adding §§ 5(a)(2)-(5) to the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2)-(5) (1964), provides some exemption for
such agreements when they are legal under the "fair-trade" laws of any "State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1964). The question
has been raised whether fair-trade laws passed by foreign governments would also
enjoy immunity from the federal antitrust laws. It has been convincingly argued
that Congress intended to allow only states in the United States to develop their
own policies free from federal interference and that it did not intend to give such
discretion to foreign governments. See J. Rahl, supra note 30, at 205-06. The same
rationale is applicable to Parker v. Brown since Congress intended neither to control
the activities of a state under the Sherman Act nor to give foreign nations complete
discretion over the applicability of the Sherman Act to American foreign commerce.
48. 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99.
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Hernandez,49 in which Chief Justice Fuller explained the doctrine in
the following terms: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory." 50 This deference to the acts
of foreign sovereign states is based upon a realization that the cause
of international harmony would not be well served by subjecting the
acts of a foreign sovereign to judicial scrutiny by American courts51
and, concurrently, upon the proper separation of powers within the
American federal government. 52 Since Underhill, the courts have
consistently refused to examine the legality or propriety of acts
carried out by a foreign sovereign within its own territory. 53
As evidenced by the Interamerican court's willingness to invoke
the act-of-state doctrine, the parallels are obvious between a situation
such as that in Interamerican and that in which the doctrine is
properly applied. But the act-of-state doctrine is not controlling in
the Interamerican situation, principally because the sovereign compulsion defense is not concerned with the validity or legality of the
foreign government's order. Rather, its concern is centered upon
determinations whether the American business was in fact ordered
to act in a manner violative of American antitrust laws and whether
it complied with that order. This concern is separate and distinct
from the concern of the act-of-state doctrine since the sovereign
compulsion defense does not involve an inquiry into the propriety of
the foreign government's act. Thus, the basic equation adopted by
the court in Interamerican that the acts of the defendants are the
same as the acts of the foreign government does not require a grant
of immunity from American antitrust laws for the defendants, and
is in itself inappropriate to a sovereign compulsion question. 54
49. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
50. 168 U. S. at 252. For a general discussion of the act-of-state doctrine, see METZGER,
Act of State Doctrine Refined: The Sabbatino Case, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 223; van
Panhuys, In the Borderland Between the Act of State Doctrine and Questions of
Jurisdictional Immunities, 13 INTL. &: COMP. L.Q. 1193 (1964); Zander, The Act of
State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INTL. L. 826 (1959).
51. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918), in which the
Supreme Court stated that judicial review of another country's sovereign acts "would
very certainly imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace
of nations."
52. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), a case
involving the expropriation of American property by the Cuban Government, the Supreme Court declared that the act-of-state doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships
between branches of government in a system of separation of powers." The Court went
on to express concern that judicial review of foreign acts might hinder the progress of
American foreign policy.
53. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). See also references cited in note 50 supra.
54. Another international-law doctrine that provides some parallel considerations
with sovereign compulsion is that of sovereign immunity. This doctrine is essentially
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Nevertheless, concepts of international comity do provide general
policy objectives-such as judicial reluctance to interfere with internal affairs of foreign sovereigns and judicial deference to the execua procedural concept protecting foreign states from suit in American courts. The origin
of this doctrine is generally traced to the case of Schooner Exch. v. M'Fadden, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). That case involved a vessel expropriated by the French
Government and converted into a warship. While docked at an American port, the
ship was libeled by its former owners. The Attorney General, acting on behalf of the
State Department, suggested to the Court that the ship be held immune from suit.
The Court specifically recognized that it had territorial supremacy and jurisdiction,
but it declined to adjudicate the merits of the case by holding that the warship was
immune from suit:
[O]ne sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can
be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended
to him.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137. The overriding concern with maintaining amicable international relations can easily be seen in this formulation of the doctrine. But the
doctrine is also based on the desire of American courts to defer to the executive
branch of government for the conduct of foreign affairs. See, e.g., National City Bank
v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361 (1955); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324
U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (in which the Court stated that the courts will follow whatever
determination the executive makes concerning whether immunity should be applied);
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
Official representatives and governmental agencies of foreign governments have
been consistently recognized as integral parts of their governments and are thereby
also eligible for immunity. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356, 358 (1955). However, the availability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity for
agents of foreign states has been considerably narrowed in the United States with the
adoption by the State Department of the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity.
This restrictive theory became the general policy of the State Department in 1952
with the writing of what has been termed the Tate Letter. This letter stated in part:
According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii)
of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) . ... [I]t will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of
sovereign immunity.
Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Dept. of State, May 19, 1952, in
26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
Sovereign compulsion could be analogized to the sovereign immunity doctrine by
considering the defendant to be effectively the agent of the foreign sovereign. However, although inquiry by an American court in a sovereign compulsion case could
produce the same international friction that sovereign immunity was designed to
prevent, principles of sovereign immunity do not control a sovereign compulsion
question. In the first place, it is doubtful that the defendant's acts would qualify for
the jure imperii requirement. But, more important, the action in a sovereign compulsion case is not against the foreign government, and the defendant cannot properly
be considered its agent. To find such agency in the typical sovereign compulsion case
would mean that every firm or individual that complies with a law or governmental
order is an agent of the government. Such an assumption amounts to a shallow and
unnecessary legal fiction.
For a general discussion of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, see T.
GIUTARRI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1970); Bishop, New United
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INTL. L. 93 (1953); Collins, The
Effectiveness of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 4 CoLUM. J. OF
TRANSNATL. L. 119 (1965); Lauterpacht, Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INTL. L. 220 (1951).
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tive branch in matters of foreign affairs-that a court may properly
consider in deciding whether to hold a business under sovereign
compulsion liable for antitrust violations. Moreover, it has previously been observed that notions of fairness suggest that it is unduly harsh to penalize a firm under American law for complying
with the laws of a foreign nation. 55 Thus, the Interamerican court
was probably correct in concluding that sovereign compulsion should
be available as a defense-at least in some circumstances. The court's
inability to articulate a clear theoretical foundation for the doctrine
of sovereign compulsion may perhaps be excused by the doctrine's
newness and uniqueness.
II.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE lNTERAMERICAN DOCTRINE

Even if the sovereign compulsion defense is desirable from the
standpoints of fairness and international comity, the question remains whether the defense, as formulated in Interamerican, is consistent with the basic policy objectives of the federal antitrust laws.
The Sherman Act extends its guarantees of free competition, not
merely to commerce among the several states, but to commerce with
foreign nations as well. 56 What, then, are the effects on free competition of the activity that the doctrine of the Interamerican case seems
to encourage?
A.

Effects on American Policy

Absent the defense of sovereign compulsion, the defendants
undoubtedly were guilty of a per se violation of the Sherman Act
by engaging in a concerted refusal to deal. 57 The court, however,
held that under the circumstances it would be unfair to subject the
defendants to antitrust liability. 58 Normally, courts do not engage
in inquiries into the reasonableness of or possible justifications for
per se offenses. As Justice Douglas wrote in United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Company 59 regarding another per se offense:
Whatever economic justification particular price fixing agreements
may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into
55. See notes 33·36 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 6 supra.
57. The same type of concerted refusal to deal found in the Interamerican case
has consistently been held by the courts to be unreasonable per se and there•
fore violative of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Radiant Burners v. People's Gas Light
Be Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1960); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207,
212 (1959); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); Silver v.
New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afjd., 373 U.S. 341, 347
(1963).
58. 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
59. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual
or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.60
This refusal to consider economic justifications has consistently been
applied in other cases involving per se offenses, including concerted
refusals to deal. 61 The concerted refusal to deal involved in Interamerican, however, was excused on the grounds of sovereign compulsion. Thus, whether or not one agrees with the seeming fairness of
the result reached in Interamerican, it should be emphasized that
the newly promulgated doctrine of sovereign compulsion provides
an escape route from per se violations of the antitrust acts and therefore presents a potential for wide-ranging complications.
A second problem revolves around the large amount of discretion
that the court in Interamerican has vested in foreign governments:
once a foreign government has acted, an American court is apparently precluded from enforcing the antitrust laws. After the defendant has shown that his conduct was ordered or directed by a foreign
government, he need merely assert the defense of sovereign compulsion in order to escape antitrust liability. Such automatic termination of antitrust suits could easily have serious consequences on
commerce and foreign affairs since the result would apparently be
the same no matter how substantial the impact of the violation on
either the commerce or the foreign policy of the United States. It
may be questioned whether the Interamerican approach would be
followed if the Italian Government were to order General Electric
and Westinghouse to merge their Italian operations and fix prices
as a condition to their doing business in Italy. Or, to suggest a more
likely possibility, what if an Arab government were to direct all
American businesses in its country to refuse to deal either directly or
indirectly with Israeli- or Jewish-controlled firms? Under the Interamerican approach, courts faced with situations such as these would
have to determine whether the American businesses were actually
compelled to act by the foreign governments involved. If so, a
court would be barred from considering the matter further.
A third and related problem under the Interamerican theory of
sovereign compulsion is that the purposes of the foreign government
in ordering a business to act in certain matters have no bearing on
the question of liability for activities violative of American antitrust
laws. In Interamerican, £or example, Venezuela was motivated both
by a desire to keep its oil from going to a bonded refinery because of
the low price at which such oil could be resold and a policy of
preventing its oil from going to what it considered to be unnatural
60. 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
61. The same policy of rejecting economic justifications for per se violations was
applied to foreign commerce in the case of Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
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markets such as Canada or Europe. 62 These factors indicated a policy
on Venezuela's part to attempt to cartelize the international market
for crude oil. Such a policy is totally inconsistent with the American
policy against restraints on free competition. However, this policy
conflict was not considered by the court in deciding whether the
sovereign compulsion defense should be applied. By not permitting
courts to consider the purposes behind a foreign sovereign's order,
the Interamerican approach would apparently leave an American
business free to participate in a foreign plan that is contrary to
American policy and interests so long as the firm was ordered to do
so by the foreign government involved.
A fourth major problem raised by the Interamerican case is the
question of the applicability of the sovereign compulsion defense to
activities that are compelled by a foreign sovereign but carried on
outside that sovereign's territory. Such a situation was presented in
the Interamerican case. The Venezuelan Government ordered that
all oil shipments to Interamerican, direct or indirect, be stopped.
Amoco, a company that was not doing business in Venezuela, responded to this order and refused to deal with Interamerican. This
company, as well as the companies actually doing business in
Venezuela, was immunized from liability by the sovereign compulsion defense. 63
As has been noted,64 Interamerican was a case of first impression,
and there was no precedential or statutory basis for allowing the
defense of sovereign compulsion. However, the problem had been
anticipated by legal scholars,65 some of whom were cited in Chief
Judge Wright's opinion. 66 While these authorities support the basic
concept of a defense of sovereign compulsion, all of them-unlike the
district court in Interamerican-would limit such immunity to
activities conducted within the foreign sovereign's territory. 67
It is uncertain what the Interamerican court's policy justification
was for its broad application of the sovereign compulsion defense.
It is, however, clear that by thus broadening the defense its potential for misuse was greatly expanded. Would it now be permissible
for Ford and General Motors to merge their entire foreign divisions
because the government of Nicaragua so ordered? Or would a
62. See note 17 supra.
63. 307 F. Supp. at 1304.
64. See text preceding note 22 supra.
65. Many legal writers have expressed the opinion that acts ordered by a foreign
government should be exempted from the enforcement of American antitrust laws.
See note 37 supra.
66. 307 F. Supp. at 1298 nn.18, 19, citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
37; K. BREWsrER, supra note 37; W. FUGATE, supra note 37; Fugate, supra note 27.
67. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 83; w. FUGATE, supra
note 37, at 148; Fugate, supra note 27, at 932.
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Turkish order that instructed American tobacco buyers who purchase tobacco in Turkey to refuse to purchase tobacco from American growers be recognized as a valid antitrust defense? The answers
to these questions would apparently be in the affirmative since the
only relevant concern of the Interamerican sovereign compulsion
test is whether the foreign government actually ordered the activity
involved.
B.

Effects on the Parties

The foregoing discussion demonstrates the very substantial costs
to American foreign and economic policy that automatic deference
to the demands of a foreign state may entail. The Interamerican
formulation of the sovereign compulsion defense also has implications for the parties involved in antitrust suits. These implications
revolve around statutory and judicial efforts to treat businesses
fairly.
It is disturbing to a sense of fairness to force a business to choose
between discontinuing its trade in a foreign country and facing
treble-damage antitrust liability at home. 68 While American courts
apparently had not directly considered the question of compulsion
by a foreign sovereign in civil cases previous to Interamerican, similar considerations of fairness had been raised in the criminal setting
in the treason cases that followed the Second World War.
In the leading case in this area, Kawakita v. United States, 60 the
petitioner was both a natural-born citizen of the United States and
a Japanese national by virtue of his parentage and of Japanese law.
He had been prevented from returning to the United States after
a visit to Japan by the outbreak of the war. During his forced stay,
however, he demonstrated considerable sympathy with the Japanese
cause through his work in a private corporation that produced war
materials. During the course of this work, the petitioner apparently
engaged in brutal abuse of American prisoners of war who were
forced to labor at the factory where he was employed. Following the
war, he reasserted his American citizenship and came back to the
United States, where he was subsequently convicted of treason. In
affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court was careful to point out
that only acts done voluntarily or wilfully by the petitioner could be
held treasonable. 70 The Court stated that had the acts been "done
under the compulsion of the job or the law or some other influence,
those acts would not rise to the gravity of that offense." 71 This
68.
69.
70.
71.

See
343
343
343

notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text.
U.S. 717 (1952).
U.S. at 735.
U.S. at 735.
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distinction between compelled and voluntary acts had previously
been recognized by the lower federal courts72 and in other commonlaw jurisdictions.73
An analogy can be drawn between criminal cases like Kawakita
and the civil antitrust case involved in lnteramerican. Both situations involved acts committed abroad that contravened American
law. The treason cases recognized that Americans should not be
subjected to criminal punishment for compelled acts. The reasoning
behind the dicta in those cases appears to have been that the defendant could not have had the requisite intent to commit treason if he
had been compelled to act and that it would be unfair to require
so harsh a choice as death or treason. 74 The sovereign compulsion
defense in civil antitrust cases involves some similar policy considerations.
The analogy between treason and antitrust cases with regard to
the sovereign compulsion defense is nevertheless imperfect in at
least one important respect. The law of treason, like most criminal
law, is principally designed to protect the interests of society as a
whole. 715 By saying that it is "fair" not to punish a defendant accused
of treason, one is merely saying that the societal welfare does not
require his punishment under the circumstances. However, different
concerns are present in the ordinary civil action-in such actions it
is clearly a goal of the law to compensate the victim for the harm he
has suffered.76 Yet, it can be argued that the antitrust laws are at least
somewhat analogous to criminal actions. The desire to protect the
societal goal- of free competition,77 the punitive nature of treble damages, 78 and the occasional exercise of traditional criminal sanctions79
all lend support to such an argument. But the antitrust laws also have
strong characteristics of civil or private law since they create private
causes of action. 80 As a result, the individual victim of anticompetitive
conduct, as well as society at large, has a broad right to protection
against such activities. Thus, even if society is willing to sacrifice its
72. See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 974-76 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler
v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 945 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
73. See, e.g., Rex v. Neumann, [1949] 3 S. AFR. L.R. 1238, 1268, 44 A.J. 423, 453.
74. See generally Westbrook, The Mental Element as a Limitation on the Law
of Treason, 68 DICK. L. R.Ev. I, 17 (1963).
75. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1969); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 7 (3d ed. 1964).
76. W. PROSSER, supra note 75, at 7.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 274 (1927).
78. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), in which the court of appeals expressly
characterized the treble-damage award as a "rigorous penalty.''
79. Criminal sanctions are provided for antitrust enforcement in § l of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1964).
80. See note 7 supra.
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general interest in free competition in order to treat American
businesses abroad fairly, the victims of what would normally be
unlawful activity under the antitrust laws may not be willing to
forego their rights to redress. In other words, concepts of fairness
toward businessmen facing conflicting laws of two sovereigns must
be balanced against concepts of fairness toward victims of anticompetitive activity.

III. A

SUGGESTED FORMULATION FOR THE

DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN COMPULSION

The court in Interamerican was concerned with furthering two
basic policy goals-intergovernmental comity and fairness to the
coerced businessman. It has been suggested in this Note that the
approach adopted by the court accepts intergovernmental comity at
heavy expense to basic American interests. 81 It has also been suggested that the abstract ideal of fairness will not always be served by
holding the violator of the antitrust laws blameless. 82 It is therefore
submitted that in the area of sovereign compulsion, as in so many
other areas of the law, the public welfare is not best served by the
automatic application of a hard and fast rule. Rather, the courts
should adopt a more flexible approach-one that aims at a just result
by balancing the equities of the particular situation with which it is
confronted.
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations83 appears to
advocate the adoption of such a balancing approach. Recognizing
that under international law two sovereigns having concurrent jurisdiction over the same businessman may simultaneously subject him
to conflicting demands, 84 the Restatement suggests that each sovereign should weigh several factors before requiring compliance with
its own law. Among the moderating factors suggested by the Restatement are the national interests of each state, the nature of the
hardship on the businessman, and the territorial impact of the required conduct. 85 Examination of such factors and others would
81. See pt. II. A. supra.
82. See pt. II. B. supra.
83. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965). See note 85 infra.
84. It should be recognized that a determination of which sovereign should make
demands upon a business when more than one sovereign has jurisdiction involves a
discussion of principles of conflict of laws. See note 85 infra. However, this discussion
of § 40 of the Restatement, which adopts a conflict-of-laws approach, will proceed
no farther than an analogy to factors a court should review when considering a
sovereign compulsion defense. The reason for this limitation is that the scope of
this Note prevents a thorough discussion of the conflicts approach. For a general dis•
cussion of the application of conflict-of-laws principles to extraterritorial enforcement
of American antitrust law, see Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust
Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259 (1960).
85. The full text of the section provides:
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introduce much-needed flexibility into the consideration of a
claimed sovereign compulsion defense.
The implementation of a balancing approach to the sovereign
compulsion situation involves a marked divergence from the legal
concepts normally applied by the courts in antitrust actions. Although this divergence might seem "radical" at first glance, it is
necessary to keep in mind the narrow and unique factual setting of
a sovereign compulsion situation-that of a business abroad being
compelled by a foreign government to engage in activities violative
of American antitrust laws.
This divergence from traditional analysis that is caused by the
doctrine of sovereign compulsion involves the introduction of a new
consideration into antitrust actions. Although the sovereign compulsion defense does not change or replace ordinary antitrust considerations, it adds a new and independent question for the court to decide.
Since the defense is intended to resolve both problems of international comity and the dilemma facing businessmen abroad, the inquiry undertaken in order to ascertain whether it will apply
will not be similar to the "rule of reason" inquiry of traditional antitrust law, which seeks to determine whether particular behavior involves an unreasonable restraint of trade. 86 Hence, the sovereign
compulsion defense requires a broad "reasonableness inquiry" that
focuses upon principles of international law and traditional equity
rather than on the restraint of trade alone. A sound approach must
allow the court the flexibility required in order adequately to review several important factors that may influence the unique sovereign compulsion setting.
One major factor that must be considered by a court using this
balancing approach is the kind of impact the compelled activity may
have upon American foreign policy. This question attains importance because a case involving foreign governmental action may
§ 40. Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction.
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
R.Esl'A.TEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965).

86. The rule-of-reason inquiry was initially adopted by the Supreme Court in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911), in which the Court ruled that
only unreasonable or undue restraints of trade were meant to be included in the
Sherman Act.
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easily entail ramifications in the area of foreign relations and upset
the desire for international comity. It may be argued that determinations of this nature are not appropriately made in a judicial forum.
However, the policy considerations involved in applying the defense
of sovereign compulsion parallel problems found in the application
of the doctrines of sovereign immunitys7 and act of state.as In applying each of these doctrines, courts are called upon to consider the possible impact of an activity or circumstance upon American foreign relations. In such situations, the courts have traditionally deferred to
any pronouncements made by the executive branch of government
that serve to define the position of American foreign policy.so
Absent any such definitive statement by the executive branch,
however, the courts have considered themselves free to make their
own determinations whether a defendant's conduct represents a
serious breach of the nation's foreign policy. 90 The advantage of
a court being able to weigh these foreign-policy ramifications was
exemplified by the somewhat emotive hypothetical case raised
above91 concerning an order by an Arab nation instructing American businesses operating within its territory to discontinue sales to
firms with Israeli or Jewish backing. Considerations of public policy
in this case could be weighed by a court adopting a balancing approach but would probably be irrelevant under the Interamerican
approach, which inquires only whether foreign governmental compulsion actually existed.
A second factor that a court should consider when ruling on a
sovereign compulsion plea is the scope of the foreign government's
directive. In the Interamerican case, Chief Judge Wright allowed
Amoco to claim the defense and thereby immunized its refusal to
deal even though it was not actually doing business in Venezuela.92
87. See, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (involving the libeling by an
American of a ship owned by Mexico); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (involving
the libeling by a Cuban corporation of a ship owned by Peru). See also note 54 supra.
88. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (involving
the expropriation by Fidel Castro's Cuban Government of property owned by American citizens). See also notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420, 436 (1964)
(implying that the Court would continue to defer to the executive branch's expressed
will in order to avoid possible inconsistent results and embarrassment to the executive
branch in its conduct of foreign affairs); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945)
("It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow •.••").
90. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964) (deter·
mining the applicability of the act-of-state doctrine when the State Department had
failed to issue any definitive suggestion); Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General,
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (in absence of suggestion
of sovereign immunity by State Department, independently determining under State
Department principles whether or not such immunity should apply).
91. See text preceding note 62 supra.
92. See note 12 supra· and accompanying text. For a discussion of the scope of
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The court apparently was not concerned that extending the sovereign compulsion defense to activities carried on outside of the
territory of the directing foreign government enables such a government to interfere unnecessarily with the regulation of American
business and commerce. Under the Interamerican rationale, for example, a court would be powerless to attach liability to American
tobacco buyers, who purchase some tobacco in Turkey, for refusing
to deal with United States sources pursuant to a directive by the
government of Turkey. While such immunity may be desirable
under some circumstances, it unduly restricts the effectiveness of the
antitrust laws to require a court automatically to grant immunity for
all anticompetitive activities, regardless of their locus, merely because they were ordered by foreign sovereigns.
A third factor that should be considered in determining whether
the sovereign compulsion defense should be allowed is the degree of
the compulsion. There are two facets of the degree question: how
much of the defendant's conduct was actually compelled and what
sanctions would have been imposed by the foreign sovereign for
noncompliance. Immunity under the sovereign compulsion defense
should not extend to acts merely requested or advised93 or to acts that
go beyond those actually compelled by the foreign government.94
Similarly, immunity should not be available if the consequences of
violating the foreign sovereign's directive are minor. On the other
hand, if compliance is required in order for the defendant to continue doing business in the foreign country, the equities for allowing the sovereign compulsion defense are much stronger.
The impact of the defendant's compelled activity upon American economic policy is a fourth factor that a court should consider. A
foreign government may easily have economic policies and purposes
that are inconsistent with the policies of the United States. An
example of this inconsistency can be found in the Interamerican case,
in which the court observed that Venezuela's purpose behind its
directives may have been to cartelize the international market in
governmental directives under the Interamerican approach, see notes 63-67 supra
and accompanying text.
93. The Supreme Court has previously disallowed immunity for acts merely permitted by foreign law or government but not actually compelled. See, e.g., Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 8c Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962) (discussed in
text accompanying notes 24-27 supra); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951).
94. The Supreme Court has refused to grant immunity for acts that go beyond
those actually compelled by the foreign government. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (discussed in notes 28-32
supra and accompanying text). Cf. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 735
(1952) (discussed in text accompanying notes 69-71 supra).
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crude oil.95 To confer automatic immunity upon a defendant who is
complying with a foreign sovereign's directive that has a purpose
adverse to American economic policy would be to give such foreign
governments a potentially powerful tool for undermining, or at least
interfering with, American policy.
A fifth factor is the quantitative and qualitative impact of the
defendant's conduct upon competition and commerce. A study of this
factor would consider, among other things, the nature of the
market in which the restraint on trade occurred, the nature of the
parties involved, and the nature of the offense itself. A restraint
occurring in a highly concentrated industry, such as the automotive
industry, is more difficult to accept than a restraint in a more com~
petitive industry, such as fishing. 96 Similarly, it is easier to accept the
settled consequences of a refusal to deal than the uncertain and
prospective consequences of a continued vertical or horizontal system
of price maintenance.97 The weight attached to this factor would
vary according to degree: the greater the damage to free competition,
the less reason to allow the defense of sovereign compulsion.
A six.th factor deserving of some weight is the nationality of the
defendant. American courts have traditionally refused to recognize
any rights in foreign nationals to different treatment under the
Sherman Act.98 However, when weighing the equities of allowing a
sovereign compulsion defense, a court might consider the fact that
the defendant is a foreign national whose acts were compelled by its
95. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
96. Thus, the more competitive the market in which the restraint occurs, the
more likely that a court would allow the defense of sovereign compulsion. Such an
approach is consistent with the recent judicial tendency disfavoring oligopolistic firms.
See Bradley, Oligopoly Power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts: From Economic
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967). In a broad range of cases, the
courts have indicated that various types of activity will violate the antitrust laws when
carried out by an oligopolist while the same activity will not be illegal when carried
out by a "true competitor." See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America,
393 U.S. 333 (1969) (exchange of price information among competitors); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (horizontal merger); FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (conglomerate merger); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964) (retail price maintenance through consignment agreements).
97. A vertical price maintenance system occurs when the parties in a sellerpurchaser relationship agree on sale and/or resale prices. See, e.g., United States v.
Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). A horizontal price maintenance system is
created when parties of the same economic function, such as two wholesalers or two
retailers who are usually, but not necessarily, competitors, agree upon sale prices.
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940).
However, even certain types of systems of horizontal price maintenance differ in their
impact upon competitive forces. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
1963 Trade Cas. 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (discussed in notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text), in which the court refused to treat the Swiss nationals any differently
than the American nationals when applying the Sherman Act.
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own government. The justifications for requiring conduct abroad
by foreign nationals to comply with American antitrust law in
sovereign compulsion situations are not nearly as compelling as when
the defendants are American nationals.99
Furthermore, in keeping with the equitable nature of the balancing approach, a court should consider as a seventh factor the
defendant's prior knowledge of the restraint. Granting immunity would seem somewhat justified if the defendant had begun
doing business in the foreign country before the activities complained of were compelled by that country's sovereign. Conversely, a
court should have less patience with a defendant who initiated activities in a foreign country knowing that he would be required by
that country's government to engage in acts violative of American
antitrust laws.
It is submitted that factors such as the seven discussed above
should be considered by a court in determining whether to apply
the doctrine of sovereign compulsion. The weight that a court
might actually accord such factors would, of course, depend upon the
particular fact situation involved in each case. However, balancing
determinations entail considerable uncertainty and cannot provide
much predictability; when a business is confronted with the harsh
choice of discontinuing business in a foreign country or facing a
crippling treble-damage action in the United States, such unpredictability is undesirable. Accordingly, if the sovereign compulsion
defense is to offer meaningful protection to Americans doing business abroad, a strong presumption in favor of allowing the defense
should attach once a showing of actual compulsion has been made.
Under such a presumption, a strong showing of other factors would
be necessary in order to defeat the defense.
Such a presumption would afford ample protection for American
businesses abroad. Were the courts willing to adopt such a presumption, businessmen would only infrequently be required to terminate
their foreign investments in circumstances involving sovereign compulsion. Although this presumption clearly would not remove all
uncertainty from the minds of Americans doing business abroad, it
should be of substantial value in affording them guidelines to follow
in their decision-making.
Establishing a presumption in favor of allowing the defense of
sovereign compulsion would also aid American courts in their
efforts to maintain international comity. It has long been a basic
policy of the federal courts that the judicial power of the United
States should not be asserted "over affairs in the domain of others
99. For a brief discussion of the desirability of allowing flexibility in the application of American antitrust laws to foreign nationals, see J. Rahl, supra note 30, at
357-59.
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unless there is demonstrable national interest sought to be protected
or public harm sought to be prevented."100 The proposed approach
would further the policy objectives of fairness to businesses abroad
and of international comity, yet would be flexible enough that it
would not unduly frustrate American antitrust policy.

IV.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE

PROPOSED BALANCING APPROACH

It is not suggested that the practical application of the proposed
balancing approach would always be easy or that the outcome of
the determination would invariably be predictable. However, the
balancing approach would at least give a court considerable flexibility in determining the equities of a particular case-flexibility
that is not available under the limited approach adopted by the
court in the Interamerican case. Moreover, the consideration of
these factors should be no more difficult for a court than the similar
balancing that it is required to undertake in most equity cases.
The operation of the proposed approach may best be understood
by applying it to two factual situations. In the Continental Ore
case,101 Electro Met, a subsidiary of Union Carbide, had been appointed the exclusive purchasing agent of vanadium for the Canadian Government. Continental Ore alleged that Electro Met had
conspired with its parent so that the advantages obtained from
possession of the exclusive franchise might be used to monopolize
vanadium production and sales in Canada. The Supreme Court
refused to immunize Electro Met from liability simply because in
its agency capacity it was acting in a manner "permitted by Canadian
Law." 102 A different question would have arisen had the Canadian
Government ordered Electro Met to deal solely with Union Carbide.
The answer of the district court that decided the lnteramerican
case would be evident: once the defendant had proved the fact of
compulsion, the defense of sovereign compulsion would have exonerated him from liability. The disquieting policy implications of
this arbitrary approach have already been discussed. 103
Under the suggested approach, once Electro Met had proved the
fact of compulsion, a presumption would arise that it was entitled
to claim the defense of sovereign compulsion. The burden would
then fall on the plaintiff to bring to the court's attention circumstances that justified disallowing the defense. One of the first things
100. Brewster, Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: "An Appraisal,"
11 ABA .ANTITRUST SECTION PROC. 65, 70 (1957). See notes 37-54 supra and accompanying text.
101. 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
102. 370 U.S. at 707.
103. See pt. II. supra.
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the court might properly consider would be the impact of the allegedly illegal activity upon the foreign policy and national interests of
the United States. If the executive branch did not submit to the court
a statement indicating whether it felt that the concerted agreement between Electro Met and Union Carbide adversely affected
national interests, the court might examine the motivating factors
behind the Canadian Government's order. In this case, the purpose
seems to have been to insure an adequate supply of vanadium to
support Canadian defense preparedness. 104 Since Canada maintains
a close military alliance with the United States, it can be assumed
that improvement in the Canadian defense posture is not adverse to
American interests. An inevitable consequence of the Canadian government's order, however, would be a dilution of the vigor of free
competition in the vanadium market. The domestic and foreign
commerce of the United States undoubtedly would be sufficiently
affected to enable the courts of the United States to assert jurisdiction
over the activities involved. 105 However, effects on commerce more
substantial than those necessary to confer jurisdiction should be required in order to defeat a claim of sovereign compulsion.106 In
this case, it seems that in any real quantitative sense, the American
economy would not have been materially affected. It should be
further noted that all of the overt activities carried on took place
within the territorial limits of Canada; 107 there was no attempt to use
Canada as a refuge for far-reaching illegal actions.
At least two other factors would remain for the court to consider, but they cannot be evaluated in this discussion because the report of the decision provided insufficient information. The court
should determine the nature of the compulsion applied by the
Canadian Government and the possible consequences faced by Electro Met should it refuse to comply with the order. The court should
also balance the potential consequences to the defendant resulting
from noncompliance with the actual injury sustained by the plaintiff.
Subject to the outcome of these two determinations, it appears from
the information available that a court confronted with the facts here
under discussion would strike the over-all balance in the defendant's
favor and grant a motion to allow the defense of sovereign compulsion.
The foregoing method of analysis also could be applied in the
Interamerican case. The court would begin with a presumption in
the defendant's favor, since adequate proof was presented demon104. See 370 U.S. at 702 n.11.
105. See notes I & 3 supra.
106. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
107. Although all overt acts were carried out within Canada, part of the alleged
conspiracy was planned in the United States. 370 U.S. at 706.
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strating the existence of actual compulsion.108 While the executive
branch of the United States Government did not submit a statement
in Interamerican commenting upon the nature of the national interests involved, it appears that the purpose of the Venezuelan Government was in part to cartelize the international market for crude oil. 100
Thus, the court could properly conclude that the purpose of the
Venezuelan order was contrary to American economic goals.
On the other hand, although the impact on the plaintiff of the
defendants' compliance was disastrous, the impact upon over-all
competition in the field did not extend beyond the plaintiff, and
hence was not great. An additional factor operating in favor of the
defense's application was the fact that the activities of Monven and
Supven resulting from the compulsion to refuse to sell crude oil
either directly or indirectly to the plaintiff were territorially confined
to Venezuela. Hence, the equities weighing against these defendants' case appear to be insufficient to overcome the strong presumption invoked in order to provide adequate protection for American
business abroad and to prevent unnecessary strains upon international comity. Since the balance of relevant considerations remains
in these defendants' favor, the sovereign compulsion defense should
be allowed.
The situation is different, however, with respect to Amoco.
Amoco was an international trading company whose only contacts
with Venezuela constituted purchasing crude oil from Venezuelan
producers and shipping it to refinery buyers. By its agreement with
Monven and Supven, it extended the scope of the Venezuelan Government's orders to activities outside Venezuelan territory. While a
definite conclusion cannot be reached concerning the issue of
Amoco's liability because of the insufficient amount of information
available, this factor should weigh against allowing Amoco to use
the shield of sovereign compulsion. Further relevant questions might
include determinations whether any sources of Venezuelan crude oil
were open to Amoco for shipment to the plaintiff aside from
Monven and Supven and whether Amoco attempted to find alternative sources of crude oil in the Middle East for Interamerican.110

V.

SUMMARY

In an era of increasing concern by governments with the trade
and economic policies of their nations, economic conflicts between
countries may be expected to continue to arise; and along with this
108. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
109. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
110. In Interamerican Amoco alleged it had tried and failed to secure alternative
sources of oil. See Joint Reply Brief on Behalf of Defendants at 18, Interamerican Ref.
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 ·(D. Del. 1970).
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rise in conflicts an increasing frequency in instances of sovereign
compulsion situations may be expected. As this occurs, American
courts should not refrain from recognizing the validity of the
sovereign compulsion defense, nor should they shy away from applying it when needed. But in applying it, the courts should not adopt a
wooden and inflexible approach. The twin policies of intergovernmental comity and fairness are not unobtainable or mutually exclusive. A court may well maximize the pursuit of these goals and
safeguard essential national interests as well if it approaches the
sovereign compulsion situation in a spirit of flexibility-seeking to
obtain maximum latitude in order to enable it to review all of the
important considerations with which it is then confronted.

